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Abstract
This study analyzes the reactions of equity holders and bondholders to the announce-
ment of 427 preferred stock issues. We document an average equity announcement
e¤ect of  0:65%. This reaction is positively inuenced by a number of measures of
rm creditworthiness and transparency and is higher for bank issuers. The equity
market reaction is negatively inuenced by convertibility (and the moneyness of the
embedded option) and by the rms accounting treatment of the issue (specically
if the issue is classied as equity). We nd that average credit default swap spreads
decrease by 50 basis points after the issue announcement. This decrease is also larger
for more creditworthy and transparent rms. Convertibility and the moneyness of
the embedded option further decrease the CDS spread. In aggregate, the decrease
in equity value is much smaller than the increase in the value of the issuers debt.
Keywords: Preferred stock, capital stucture
JEL Classication Code: G14, G32
1 Introduction
A key part of the TARP capital purchase program in Fall 2008 was the purchase
of $250 billion of senior preferred shares from qualifying U.S.-controlled nancial
services companies. While this infusion of capital did much to avoid a market failure,
shareholders of these nancial institutions were not universally in favor of the decision
because of the high dividend rates and the warrants granted to the government.
Veronesi and Zingales (2010) document that the "winners" were bondholders of the
largest investment banks and the major "losers" were J. P. Morgan equity investors
and (naturally) U.S. taxpayers.
On November 17, 2010, as part of its IPO, General Motors issued 87 million shares
of mandatory convertible, junior preferred stock, raising a total of $4.35 billion.
Earlier, on August 18, 2010, Bloomberg News noted that: The preferred shares
were added to attract hedge funds and other new investors because the shares have
attributes of both debt and equity, the people familiar with the plans said.1 This
di¤ering inuence of preferred stock issuance on equity and debt investors is the
focus of this study.
This paper thus addresses one of the most important areas of corporate nance:
capital structure. The academic research ranges from the seminal work of Modigliani
and Miller (1958), to the theoretical development of Hart (1995) and many others,
to a huge volume of empirical studies. Almost all of this research has focused on
the debt versus equity decision, leaving aside the issue of preferred stock. This is an
important omission since preferred stock is an essential source of capital for many
U.S. corporations. For example, over the 1999 to 2005 period studied in this paper,
U.S. rms led to issue over $868 billion in straight and convertible preferred stock.
In comparison, U.S. rms led to raise $374 billion through IPOs and $590 billion
through SEOs2 over this period.3
1Bloomberg News, August 18, 2010.
2Source: Securities Data Company (SDC).
3In contrast, Bajaj, Mazumdar and Sarin (2002) document that during the 1985-1999 period,
1
As noted above, preferred stock played a central role in mitigating the recent
nancial crisis. A prominent pair of examples occurred in October, 2008, withWarren
Bu¤etts infusion of $3 billion into GE and $5 billion into Goldman Sachs, both
investments in the form of perpetual preferred stock with warrants. This was the
harbinger of many bank preferred issues during and following the nancial crisis.
These issues were often perceived as a nancing of last resort. The bank securities
often took the form of trust preferred, a recent innovation using a special purpose
vehicle, which has spurred the recent growth in preferred stock issuance by both
banks and corporations.4
The hybrid nature of preferred stock is an important issue; it is neither equity
nor debt, which creates ambiguity about its impact on rm value and the potential
reactions of various rm stakeholders. Evidence of its hybrid nature can be seen
from the di¤erences between a rms preferred stock ratings and the ratings on its
subordinated debt issues, which are most signicant for lower credit quality rms.5
Furthermore, rms vary in their accounting treatment of a preferred issue; some
rms considering it as equity, some as debt and others as hybrids.
This paper empirically analyzes 427 preferred stock issues. Its goal is to deter-
mine the short-term reaction of equity holders and of bondholders. It is reasonable
to believe that, because of their di¤erent relative positions with respect to preferred
stock in the event of bankruptcy, bondholders and equity holders would have vary-
ing responses to the announcement of a preferred issue. We measure the reaction
of equity holders using event study methodology. If equity holders viewed preferred
as equity, one would expect that the announcement e¤ect would be negative.6 Con-
capital raised through SEOs was almost twice the dollar volume raised through straight and con-
vertible preferred stock combined.
4The recent trends in domestic preferred stock issuance have been quite dramatic. In 2008, $77.9
billion was issued, the highest amount ever, but this gure fell to $9.6 billion in 2009, the lowest
amount issued since 1990. In 2011 the total issuance of preferred stock was $13.3 billion. These
data are from sifma.org.
5Moodys Investors Services (1998).
6See Masulis and Korwar (1986) for the announcement e¤ect of seasoned equity issues.
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versely, if equity holders perceive preferred as straight debt, we would expect to see
an insignicant reaction, as is observed for public debt issues.7
The response of bondholders is evaluated using changes in the credit default swap
(CDS) spreads.8 This approach has been shown to be superior to an analysis of bond
yields, since the latter contain many confounding e¤ects. Furthermore, CDS spreads
have been shown to anticipate bond rating changes.9 After the announcement, one
could expect CDS spreads to narrow because of the decrease in leverage. Conversely,
bondholders could perceive the increased commitment to pay preferred dividends
as an additional constraint on the rms ability to service its debt. Furthermore,
the choice of preferred rather than debt could be interpreted as a signal of nancial
distress, as was clear during the nancial crisis.
Based on the studies outlined briey in the following section, the two major
hypotheses analyzed in this study are the following, although it is important to note
that these hypotheses are, in general, extrapolated from theoretical and empirical
research that focuses on the debt-equity decision, rather than research that directly
addresses preferred stock.
Bondholder hypothesis: When a rm announces an issue of preferred stock
its bondholders react favorably. The issue decreases both the rms leverage and
its nancial distress risk. If the rm has higher earnings potential, bondholders will
react more positively, since this makes the nancing of last resort motive less credible.
Stockholder hypothesis: When a rm announces an issue of straight preferred
stock, its equity holders have an insignicant reaction. The issue creates no dilution
and it reduces the potential adverse selection problems between managers and share-
holders. However, for distressed rms, shareholders could react negatively because
7See Eckbo (1986). However, more recently, Cai and Zhang (2011) nd increases in leverage,
especially for highly leveraged rms, lead to lower stock returns.
8The role of CDS spreads as early indicators of nancial distress is discussed in Longsta¤ (2009).
9See Hull, Predescu and White (2004) and Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2009).
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of the possible wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders.10 Since convert-
ible issues potentially create dilution, shareholders should react negatively to these
issues; this reaction would depend on the moneyness of the embedded option.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a very
brief review of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data and the sample
selection process. Section 4 presents the estimation and interpretation of our results.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Literature review
There is signicant theoretical and empirical support for the positive impact of pre-
ferred stock issuance. The theoretical model of Heinkel and Zechner (1990) shows
that preferred stock increases the debt capacity of a rm given that a rm can delay
preferred dividends. Similarly, Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) argue that pre-
ferred stock reduces the probability of nancial distress.11 Pinegar and Lease (1986)
examine the impact of preferred-for-common exchange o¤ers and nd a systematic
increase in the value of the rm. Conversely, Irvine and Rosenfeld (2000) nd that
rms that use preferred stock to retire bank debt experience a negative shock to their
stock prices.
The issue of information asymmetry has been an important component of this
strand of the academic literature. Chandy, Hsueh and Liu (1993) nd that rms
with higher information asymmetry between managers and shareholders experience a
relatively larger negative stockholder reaction when its preferred stock is downgraded.
Chemmanur and Liu (2006) construct a theoretical model of security issuance based
on heterogeneous beliefs between the insiders (existing equity holders) and outsiders
(new investors). They nd that if the level of heterogeneity in beliefs is high, the
10A behavioral viewpoint on bondholder-shareholder conicts, leverage and stock prices is pre-
sented in Hackbarth (2009).
11See Blau and Fuller (2008) for a development of the link between nancial exibility and
dividend payments.
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rm will not issue equity. Similarly, Dittmar and Thakor (2007) develop a theory
to explain security issuance based on market perception. They show that if the
expectations of the market and the rms managers are similar, the rm will issue
equity, otherwise it will choose debt. In a related study, Chemmanur, Nandy and
Yan (2007) provide empirical empirical support for this notion.
The literature also indicates that preferred issues by banks are viewed di¤erently
from other issues. Fields and Webb (1997) examine shareholder wealth e¤ects of the
announcement of straight preferred stock issues made by nancial institutions and
nd no increase in the value of common stock. Benston, Irvine, Rosenfeld and Sinkey
(2000) examine bank holding companies and nd that regulatory capital requirements
can have a signicant positive e¤ect on the demand for capital, and that growth and
investment opportunities do not have a signicant e¤ect on the demand for capital.
Kim and Stock (2012) examine the impact of TARP preferred stock issuance on
existing preferred shares. They nd that the overall impact is positive on existing
preferred shares, especially in the case of preferred stockholders of banks that issued
voluntarily and banks that issued trust preferred stock.12 Finally, Harvey, Collins
and Wansley (2003) address the impact of the issuance of Trust Preferred Securities
on both debt and equity for banks. They nd that there is a positive impact on
both classes of securities. Our study di¤ers from theirs in numerous ways. Firstly
we address all types of preferred stock issuers, not just banks. We use CDS spreads
to gauge the impact on bondholders and we consider all types of preferred issues.
In summary, these theoretical and empirical studies present a mixed picture of
the benets of issuing preferred stock. The goal of this study is to attempt to present
an alternative empirical perspective by analyzing di¤erent stakeholdersreactions to
the same preferred issue. Furthermore, by analyzing both straight and convertible
preferrred, we can analyze a spectrum of varying degrees of "equityness" in the
preferred issue.13
12The TARP program required a number of the largest nancial institutions to issue preferred
shares. Subsequently, a signicant number of other banks voluntarily issued TARP preferred stock.
13Note that we are not attempting to determine the optimal use of preferred stock in the capital
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3 Data and sample selection
The preferred stock issues were obtained from the SDC Platinum database for the
years 1999 through 2005,14 yielding 1; 211 lings for a total of $680 billion. An-
nouncement dates are from the Factiva newswire. Table 1 reports the details of the
overall dataset and the number of rms remaining after each lter. After matching
to CRSP and Compustat, 643 issues remained. After the remaining lters, shelf
lings, elimination of multiple preferred stock issues (only the issue corresponding to
the initial announcement date is considered), issues for renancing and closed end
funds,15 we are left with a sample of 427 issues.
3.1 Sample composition
Table 2 shows the distribution of rms and events, in the cross-section and across
time of the six classes of rms analyzed:
Banks: This category contains savings and loan institutions, commercial banks
and other nancial institutions. They constitute 15:5% of the sample. Banks are
treated as a separate group for the majority of our empirical analysis due to their
regulatory structure.
Utilities: These are electric service, transportation, construction and gas distrib-
ution rms. They constitute 12:7% of the sample.
REITs: Because of their (essentially) tax-exempt status and their lack of internal
cash ow (due to dividend payout restrictions) real estate investment trusts (REITs)
are the largest group in our sample, comprising 43:8% of the issues.
Insurance: Insurance rms represent 9:6% of the sample.
Investment Banks: Investment banks form 4:2% of the sample.
structure. Rather our emphasis is on the issuances impact on various stakeholders. A REIT capital
structure analysis including preferred stock is presented in Boudry, Kallberg and Liu (2010).
14The data start in 1999 to coincide with the availability of our credit default swap spread data.
15Since our theories of capital structure do not readily apply to closed-end funds, and there are
no credit default swap data for them, they are excluded from our nal sample.
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Industrials: These rms are 14:3% of our sample. Interestingly, industrials issued
no straight preferred during this time period.
Table 2 further shows the time series variation in issuance volume. It demon-
strates that the issue distribution is relatively uniform over the sample period. The
largest number of issues (19:4%) was in 2004. The smallest percentage was in 2000
(7:7% of the total), largely due to the small number of REIT issues in that year,
which coincides with the end of the bull market in real estate. In our sample, the
mean book leverage is 75% and the minimum leverage is 25%. The bond ratings
range from AA+ for banks to CCC+ for some REITs and utilities. This suggests
that the sample does not contain too many nancially distressed rms and that debt
is a viable alternative to preferred stock for many of these rms.
3.2 Accounting treatment of preferred issues
Given the hybrid nature of preferred stock, it is reasonable that the accounting
treatment of a new issue is relevant.16 For each issue we searched the 10Ks and
nancial statements to determine how the issue was classied into the 3 possibilities:
debt, equity or hybrid. We were able to determine the accounting treatment for all
427 issues in our sample.
The preferred issues were divided as follows: in 120 cases, the rm unambiguously
classied the issue as debt. Another 139 issues were classied as equity if preferred
stock was listed in stockholders equity in the balance sheet and there was no indi-
cation that it was used as leverage nor any mention of the dividend payments being
included in xed charges. The preferred issue was deemed to be a hybrid (168 cases)
if the issuing rm recognized preferred stock as a debt instrument or if they used it
as a form of leverage. We also classied issues as hybrids if the issuer listed preferred
stock as a separate line item instead of including it either as debt or as equity. Table
3 shows the breakdown of our sample by the issues accounting treatment. While
there appears to be some commonality by industry, there is still substantial variation
16We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this area of research.
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across issuer groups.
3.3 Variables and hypotheses
The cross-sectional variables analyzed were obtained from COMPUSTAT, CRSP and
I/B/E/S.17 The debt analysis used credit default swap spread data from Lombard
Risk Value Spread Credit Data Services. All accounting data are from the year
prior to the issue announcement.
Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR): The interest coverage ratio is EBIT divided by
the total interest expense. Higher values of ICR should lead to a more positive an-
nouncement e¤ect by decreasing the probability of wealth transfers from stockholders
to bondholders. If bondholders believe that the proceeds of the issue will be used
for positive NPV investments, we would expect the CDS spreads to be narrower for
issuers with a high ICR ratio.18
We include 3 measures of information asymmetry: (i) Dividend to Free Cash Flow
Ratio, the higher the ratio, the lower is the information asymmetry. (ii) Number of
Analysts: This is the number of analysts that provided long-term earnings estimates
for the rm in the year prior to the announcement. The higher the number of analysts
the lower the information asymmetry. (iii) Earnings to Price: This is the average
forecasted long-term earnings per share from I/B/E/S divided by the market price
of a share of the rm at the end of the year prior to the event year. The higher the
future earnings potential, the lower will be the information asymmetry, as well as the
agency problems between shareholders and managers. In each of these cases, lower
information asymmetry should be positively related to the announcement e¤ect (i.e.,
make it less negative) and negatively related to CDS spreads (i.e., make the spread
narrower).
17For COMPUSTAT items, if data were missing for the year prior to the event year, they were
obtained from the earliest available prior year. The maximum lag was 2 years. Data were available
for every event within that timeframe with around 65% coming from the rst lagged year.
18The interest coverage ratio values are winsorized at 90%: 5% at the low tail and 95% at the
high tail.
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Credit Watch: Preferred stock issues are usually rated by one of the two major
xed income rating agencies. After the initial preferred stock rating, within a week,
rms are placed on credit watch for a possible revision of their overall credit rating
by Moodys or Standard and Poors.19 Three possible actions can be taken by the
credit rating agencies:
a. Firm is on credit watch for possible upgrade
b. Firm is on credit watch for possible downgrade
c. Firms credit conditions are stable and they are not on credit watch.
If a rm undergoes action a, the Credit Watch variable takes on a value of 1. For
actions b and c, the Credit Watch variable takes values  1 and 0 respectively. The
Credit Watch variable captures the expected change in the debt servicing capability
of a rm. 107 rms were placed on credit watch within the week following their
preferred stock issue. 57 were placed on credit watch for a possible upgrade; 50 were
placed on credit watch for a possible downgrade. The Credit Watch variable should
have a positive impact on the announcement e¤ect and should decrease the CDS
spread.
Moneyness: Moneyness is dened as the share price at the issue date divided
by the conversion price of the option embedded in the convertible preferred stock.20
Greater moneyness should decrease both the equity announcement e¤ect and the
CDS spread.
PREF : This is a dummy variable set to 1 if the rm issued trust preferred stock
and 0 otherwise. Based on the analysis of Harvey, Collins and Wansley (2003)
and Kim and Stock (2012), we would expect that this variable would increase the
announcement e¤ect and decrease the CDS spread.
Mandatory: The convertible subsample included 48 issues of mandatory convert-
ibles. These are convertibles that are forced to convert to equity within a relatively
short timeframe (typically less than four years) and are thus more like a delayed
equity issue than the standard covertible preferred. Huckins (1999) shows that the
19The credit watch data were obtained from the web sites of Moodys and Standard and Poors.
20By denition, straight preferred stocks have a moneyness value of zero.
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announcement e¤ect of a mandatory convertible preferred is insignicant overall,
and is positive for low risk rms.21 This dummy variable is set to one for issues of
mandatory convertible preferred. We expect that this dummy would decrease both
the announcement e¤ect and the CDS spread.
Bank : This dummy variable is set to one for issues by banks.22 Based on the
analysis of Benston, Irvine, Rosenfeld and Sinkey (2003) as well as Kim and Stock
(2012), we would expect this dummy to increase the announcement e¤ect and de-
crease the CDS spread.
Convertible: This dummy variable is set to 1 for issues of convertible debt. As
with mandatory convertibles, we would expect convertible issues to decrease both
the announcement e¤ect and the CDS spread.
Debt and Equity: These are dummy variables set to 1 if the preferred issue is
accounted for as debt or equity, respectively. We expect that issues classied as
equity would decrease both the announcement e¤ect and the CDS spread.
Market cap: Market capitalization is included as, i.a., a proxy for risk and liq-
uidity. We would expect that higher market cap would increase the announcement
e¤ect and decrease the CSDS spread.
We also include year dummies. During this sample period, interest rates were, on
average, lower than the previous decade, and it is plausible that preferred issuance
may be negatively correlated with interest rates. While we have already eliminated
rms that have simply issued preferreds to renance, the year controls should capture
this e¤ect.
21A theoretical development of mandatory convertible issuance is presented in Chemmanur,
Nandy and Yan (2004).
22Dummy variables for other issuer types were initially included as further controls but these
dummies were never signicant.
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3.4 Performance measures
The change in the credit default spread measures the short-term impact of the pre-
ferred issue on bondholders. We use the standard event study methodology to eval-
uate the short-term impact on shareholders.23 The independent variables are the
following:
Default Spread: We use the one-year average credit default swap spread for each
issue.24 This maturity was chosen to match the short-term impact as measured in the
announcement e¤ect. Lombard Risk calculates the mean and dispersion of the default
spread from the data contributed by key market makers. To calculate the change
in credit risk, we subtract the average CDS spread following the announcement of
preferred stock issue from the average CDS spread prior to the event. There are 110
matches for the preferred stock issues. The total number of unique rm matches was
102. Table 4 shows the CDS distribution.
Abnormal returns: We use a four-factor model with Fama-French and momentum
factors. The value-weighted CRSP return index is used as the market return. The
estimation window is ( 300; 46).25
The explanatory variables were checked for cross-sectional correlation to avoid
multi-collinearity biases in the estimation. The only signicant correlation was be-
tween the forecasted earnings to price ratio and the dividend to free cash ow ratio.
This correlation is  12%, which is not large enough to create multi-collinearity bias
in the estimation.
23In an analysis not reported here, we use both market and accounting performance measures to
show that the di¤erence in long-run performance between preferred stock issuers and non-issuers is
insignicant. These results provide no evidence for market timing by preferred issuers.
24See Longsta¤, Mithal and Neis (2005) for an analysis of CDS spreads and liquidity. The role
of recovery rates in CDS pricing is analyzed in Schneider, Sogner and Veza (2010).
25The minimum estimation period for each calculation is xed at 10 days to avoid noisy estimates
of the coe¢ cients and the abnormal returns.
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4 Empirical results and interpretation
The results of the event study based on the announcement dates from Factiva
are summarized in Table 5. The event windows used in the full sample analysis
are ( 3; 2); ( 1; 1); (2; 3) and (2; 4). Cumulative Abnormal Return is the equally-
weighted cumulative abnormal return of a portfolio of rms over the return window.26
Positive: Negative is the number of positive and negative abnormal returns of the
individual stocks.
Panel A of Table 5 shows that the abnormal returns are negative and signicant
only for the ( 1; 1) window. Event windows that do not contain the announcement
date are all insignicant. This average CAR,  0:65%; while signicant at the 1%
level, is closer to the typical stockholder reaction to debt issues and smaller than the
normal reaction to seasoned equity issues, which fall in the range of  3% to  7%.27
Our results suggest that, on average, equity holders do not view preferred stock
issues as excessively dilutive or as a sign of nancial distress. From this analysis
we can estimate that the average market value of equity decreases by $27 million
(based on the cumulative abnormal return of  0:65% and average equity market
capitalization of rms in the sample) after the announcement of a preferred stock
issue.
The analysis of CDS spreads is presented in Panel B Table 5. The key nding
is that there is a 19% decrease (49:8 basis points) in the average default spread.
The dispersion in default spreads decreases by 16%. Both values are statistically
signicant at the 5% level. These results imply a short-term reduction in credit risk
and in its variation.
Panel C then partitions the CARs over the ( 1; 1) event window and changes in
CDS spreads by issue and issuer type. We nd that bank issues had a 1:36% more
positive equity market reaction than non-bank issues. TPS issues had a 0:99% higher
CAR than non-TPS issues, consistent with Kim and Stock (2012). As expected, due
26The tails are winsorized at 98% to avoid extreme outliers.
27See, for example, Masulis and Korwar (1986).
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to the potential for dilution, convertible issues have a CAR 3:78% lower than straight
preferred issues. Interestingly, the accounting treatment also had a signicant impact
on the CARs. Issues accounted for as debt had a 0:96% higher CAR than issues
treated as equity. All of these 4 di¤erences are signicant at the :05 level and all but
the TPS/non-TPS di¤erence are signicant at the :01 level.
Columns 4 to 6 in Panel C show that these characteristics seem to play a less
important role for bondholders than for stockholders. Here the di¤erences are quite
small and none are signicant at the :01 level. The only signicant di¤erence at the
:05 level occurs for banks issues (12:98 bp reduction) and for issues treated as debt
(11:06 bp reduction). The next two sections further explore how these issue and
issuer characteristics inuence the reaction of stockholders and bondholders.
4.1 Cross-sectional analysis of CARs
The cross-sectional analysis from the equity perspective is presented in the second
column of Table 6.28 We nd that the number of analysts, earnings-to-price ratio,
the interaction between the earnings-to-price ratio and the number of analysts, ICR,
the Credit Watch and Bank dummies have a positive and signicant relation with
the abnormal returns. The positive and signicant sign on the earnings-to-price ratio
suggests that equity holders of rms with good investment opportunities view the
preferred issuance more favorably. The greater the number of analysts covering a
rm and the higher the earnings potential of the rm as certied by those analysts,
the less the information asymmetry, resulting in a more positive reaction. The ICR
and Credit Watch dummy both have a positive e¤ect. This is consistent with the
notion that for rms with lower distress risk, equity holders view preferred stock
more favorably.
The Money, Mandatory and Convertible dummies are all negatively related to
abnormal returns, not surprisingly, since issues that have a greater potential for stock
28All the regressions include the controls discussed above, although these controls have no sta-
tistical signicance.
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dilution should be viewed more negatively by shareholders. The signicant positive
coe¢ cient on the Bank dummy implies that equity markets react more favorably to
banks issuing preferred shares than to other industries. This is consistent with the
results of Benston, Irvine, Rosenfeld and Sinkey (2003). The accounting treatment
of the preferred issue also has a signicant impact: the negative coe¢ cient on the
Equity dummy is consistent with the notion that shareholders react more negatively
to more equity-like issues. The dummy variable for TPS is insignicant, suggesting
that this innovation is not inuencing our results.
4.2 Analysis of credit default swap spreads
The third column in Table 6 analyzes the determinants of the decrease in CDS
spread. The signs on the variables related to creditworthiness and protability are
very similar to those from the equity market regression. The coe¢ cients on variables
that are associated with stronger or safer rms (number of analysts, earning to price
ratio, Dividends over FCF ratio, Credit Watch, ICR and Market Cap) are positive
and signicant. Since the Money and Mandatory variables are both positive and sig-
nicant, the possibility of future dilution also reduces the spread. The insignicant
dummy for convertible issues combined with the positive and signicant coe¢ cients
on Money and Mandatory imply that the structure of the convertible strongly in-
uences the CDS spread. However, unlike column 2, none of the dummy variables
characterizing TPS issues, bank issuers or the accounting treatment of the preferred
issue are signicant.
The result that the CDS spread decline is larger for better rms is perhaps surpris-
ing. This observation suggests that the credit markets view the issuance of preferred
stock by weaker rms as a form of nancing of last resort. A rm with higher earn-
ings potential has a higher likelihood of having sustainable cash ows, which leads
to a decline in default spreads. In addition, as the information asymmetry between
the manager and the bondholder declines, bondholders are more condent that the
rm can satisfy its obligations to them.
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We also performed two robustness checks, which are not detailed here. In the
rst analysis, the sample was partitioned into issues with the lowest and highest
CDS spreads. The results were almost identical to those presented in Table 6, which
suggests that the decline in the CDS spread is not limited to the highest risk rms.
Since rms with CDS data are generally larger and more likely to be banks, there is a
potential bias in the CDS analysis. We replicated the regression in Table 6 excluding
banks.29 Other than a slight reduction in statistical power, all of the key results are
preserved. This similarity in the fall sample and the non-bank sample highlights the
fact that the benet from issuing preferred stock is not coming from regulatory or
other inuences that are unique to nancial institutions, but rather is a more general
result.
The estimated reduction in CDS spreads implies that the average book value of
debt increases by $152 million. This gure is based on the 50 basis point average
decrease in the credit default swap spread, together with an estimated average bond
duration of 4, and the average book value of debt of rms in our sample, $7:6 billion.
This number is signicantly higher than the estimated decrease in equity value of $27
million, indicating that the net short-term e¤ect of a preferred issue is to increase
the rm value.
5 Conclusion
The academic literature on capital structure theory and empirical analysis has paid
very little attention to the use of preferred stock, even though it is an important
source of external nancing and despite its impact on the nancial crisis. This
empirical study analyzes the reactions of equity holders and bondholders to the
announcement of 427 preferred stock issues. We document an average equity an-
nouncement e¤ect of  0:65%. This reaction is positively inuenced by a number of
29Once banks are excluded from the sample, there is an insignicant size di¤erence between rms
with CDS data and those without it.
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measures of rm creditworthiness or transparency and is higher for bank issuers. The
equity market reaction is negatively inuenced by convertibility (and the moneyness
of the embedded option) and by the rms accounting treatment of the issue (specif-
ically if the issue is classied as equity rather than as debt or as a hybrid). Based on
the market capitalization of our sample rms, the issuance of preferred stock results
in an average decline of $27 million in shareholder value.
We nd that average credit default swap spreads decrease by 50 basis points after
the issue announcement. Like the equity market reaction, this decrease is larger for
more creditworthy and transparent rms. Convertibility and the moneyness of the
embedded option further decrease the CDS spread. This decline in CDS spreads
implies an average gain in book value of $152 million, 5:6 times the negative impact
on the issuers equity. This result implies that there is a net positive impact on
rm value. Our analysis further demonstrates that these net gains are not due to
regulatory e¤ects (since the gains do not accrue only to banks) or to innovations in
corporate structuring (since the TPS dummy is never signicant).
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Table 1: Data filters 
 
 
The sample of preferred stock filings and issues was collected from the SDC database. These 
firms were then matched with CRSP for the daily returns data. The announcement dates were 
found through a FACTIVA news search based on the filing and issue dates. The number of 
unique announcements was identified by analyzing Factiva news announcements for the final 
sample.  
 
 
 
Stage Number of events Filters 
1 1211 Total number of issues recorded by SDC database 
2 643 Events that had a CRSP and Compustat match 
3 617 Firms that had shelf filings removed 
4 585 Re-financing (Preferred for Preferred) removed 
5 516 Number of unique announcements (events) 
6 427 Closed-end funds removed 
  
 
 
Table 2: Time-series and cross-section of preferred stock announcements 
 
The number of firms that issued preferred stock between 1999 and 2005 here are split by year 
and type of issuer. The purpose of this table is to illustrate that the issues do not cluster around 
the years 2001 and 2002 when the interest rates were the lowest. 
Year Banks Utilities REIT Insurance
Inv.  
Bank 
Ind- 
ustrial Total 
Percentage
 share 
 of events 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Total          
Percentage 
 share 
 of events          
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Table 3: Accounting treatment of preferred 
 
This table partitions the sample by the accounting treatment of the preferred issue. For each issue 
we searched the 10Ks and financial statements to determine how the issue was classified into the 
three possibilities: debt, equity or hybrid. 
 
   Preferred Stock Declaration in the 10K Filings 
   Debt Equity Hybrid 
Banks 46 10 10 
Utilities 27 10 18 
REIT 25 73 89 
Insurance 11 12 16 
Investment Bank  4 6 8 
Industrial 7 28 27 
 
 
Table 4: Time series and cross section of CDS data  
 
The number of CDS events in the cross section and time series is given below. REITs, Banks and 
Industrials were the only industry types in the sample that had CDS data. They were available 
during the years 2000 through 2005. The last column indicates the total number of preferred 
stock announcements in each year. A comparison of the number of CDS events with that of the 
total preferred stock announcements gives an estimate of the number of sample firms and events 
for which CDS data are available. 
 
Year Bank REIT Industrial 
Total  
CDS  
events 
Percentage  
share of  
events 
Total  
Preferred 
Stock 
Ann.  
events 
      
      
      
      
      
      
Total       
Percentage share  
of events   

  

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Table 5: Cumulative abnormal returns around preferred issue announcements 
 
An event-study was conducted based on the preferred issuance announcement dates found on 
Factiva newswire. The estimation window is ). The estimation model is a four-factor 
model with Fama-French and momentum factors. Value-weighted CRSP return index is the 
proxy for the market return. Event Window is the trading day window around the announcement 
date. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the equally-weighted abnormal return of a portfolio 
of firms over the return window. Positive: Negative is the number of positive and negative 
abnormal returns of the individual firms that were used in calculating the abnormal returns. The 
difference in means test measures the difference in CARs by issuer/issue type. Panel A presents 
the aggregate data. Time to maturity is one year1 for the credit default swaps. Average default 
spread is the average of default spreads charged by the market maker. Percentage change in 
average default spread has been calculated based on the values of the last trading prior to the 
preferred stock announcement and the first trading date after the announcement. Panel A shows 
the full sample results for equity. Panel B represents the reaction to credit default swap spreads 
following the preferred stock issues. Panel C partitions the sample by issue and issuer type for 
both debt and equity reactions. We apply the difference in means test to determine if the means 
of the above sub-groups are significantly different from each other. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively.  
 
Panel A: All preferred stock issue announcements – equity reaction 
 
Return window Cumulative abnormal return Positive : Negative t-stat 
   
   
   
   
 
Panel B: All preferred stock issue announcements – debt reaction 
 
Average Default  
Spread (bp) 
Dispersion of Default 
Spread (bp) 
Change 
 in Average 
Spread 
Change  
in Dispersion of  
Default Spread 
Average    
Median    
Std    
Max    
Min    
 
                                                 
1 In addition to one year credit default swaps, we tested the changes in spread for 3, 5, 7 and 10 year swaps and did 
not find any significant results. 
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Panel C: Issues partitioned by issuer or issue type 
 
 Equity Reaction Debt Reaction 
Issue/Issuer type CAR  Difference in means 
Average 
Default 
Spread 
(bps) 
Percentage 
Change 
in Average 
Default 
Spread 
Difference in 
means 
Bank issuer     
Non-bank issuer     
Trust preferred issue     
Non-trust-preferred issue     
Straight preferred issue     
Convertible preferred issue     
Issue treated as debt     
Issue treated as equity     
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Table 6: Cross-sectional regressions for equity and debt 
 
The left hand side variable for the equity regression is the abnormal return from the event 
window ). The left hand side variable for the debt regression is the decrease in average 
default spread (in basis points) for one-year contracts.Intercept is the intercept term from the 
cross-sectional OLS regressions. NOA t-1 represents the number of analysts that followed a 
particular firm in the year prior to the preferred stock issue announcement. E/Pt-1 represents the 
earnings to price ratio, where earnings is the average long-term earnings forecast across analysts, 
from IBES. ICRt-1 is the interest coverage ratio. (DIV/FCF) t-1 is the ratio of the total dividends 
paid out by the firm to free cash flow. Credit Watch is an indicator variable for possible rating 
changes. Money is the ratio of the current stock price to the conversion price at the 
announcement date. Market cap is the issuer’s market capitalization. Mandatory, TPS, Bank, 
Convertible, Debt, Equity are all dummy variables with 1 indicating mandatory convertibles, 
TPS issues, bank issuers, Preferred accounted for as debt or as equity. ***, ** and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Year dummies were included to capture/control for the year-specific macro-economic effects in all 
the cross-sectional regressions and were found to be insignificant. Industry dummies were also 
included in all the cross sectional regressions to capture industry-specific effects, but were found to 
be insignificant except for bank issuers 
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  Equity                          Debt
Intercept  
  
NOA t-1  
  
E/P x 102  t-1  
  
E/P x NOA x 102  t-1  
  
ICR t-1  
  
DIV/FCF t-1  
  
Credit Watch  
  
Money  
  
Mandatory -0.031* 
  
Market Cap  
  
TPS  
  
Bank  
  
Convertible  
  
Debt  
  
Equity  
  
No. Obs.  
Adj. R-squared  
 
